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The Effects of Occupational Licensure on Competition, Consumers, and the Workforce |
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BY: Patrick McLaughlin, Matthew D. Mitchell, Anne Philpot
DATE: November 3, 2017
Exerpt: “Occupational licensing has expanded significantly over the last 50 years. In 1950, 5 percent of the workforce was licensed through state laws, and in 2000 that number approached 20 percent. When federal licenses are also accounted for, one estimate for 2006 is that 29 percent of the workforce was licensed. This growth in licensure arises primarily from the growth in the number of occupations for which a license is required by the state, not from people switching from jobs that do not require occupational licenses to jobs that do. While there is a great deal of variation across states in the number of occupations for which a license is required as well as in the requirements to obtain a license, every state has seen an increase in both."
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A Snapshot of Occupational Licensing Regulation in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic States |
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BY: Kofi Ampaabeng, Edward J. Timmons, Conor Norris
DATE: August 12, 2020
Summary: “In this policy brief, we compare the overall stringency of occupational licensing regulations for
select states in the Midwest and mid-Atlantic states. This direct comparison allows us to identify
states within a region whose level of occupational licensing regulation makes them outliers and
states that should serve as a model for reform."
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The State of Occupational Licensure: Arkansas |
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BY: Patrick A. McLaughlin, Matthew D. Mitchell, Anne Philpot, and Thomas Snyder
DATE: September 25, 2017
“When a state imposes licensing rules on an occupation, workers cannot legally practice that trade without fulfilling a set of requirements. Occupational licensing is presumably intended to protect the public from unsafe and low-quality service. But a broad and growing consensus among economists suggests that these rules primarily serve to protect incumbent providers from competition at the cost of higher consumer prices and excessive barriers for new entrants in the field. Despite the common perception, licensing rules are not shown to improve service quality or safety. In this policy brief, we focus on occupational licensing in the state of Arkansas. This state has some of the most burdensome license requirements in the United States. We discuss the economic effects of licensure, and we draw a roadmap for reform."
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The State of Occupational Licensure: Wisconsin |
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BY: Patrick A. McLaughlin, Matthew D. Mitchell, Anne Philpot, and Tamara Winter
DATE: September 25, 2017
“In many lines of work, those who enter the field must first obtain a government-issued license. In order to obtain a license, prospective licensees may be required to take tests, pay fees, undergo certain training, or fulfill other requirements such as residency, age, or education. Occupational licensing is ostensibly intended to protect the public from unsafe and low-quality service. But a broad and growing consensus among economists suggests that these rules mostly serve to protect incumbent providers from competition, raising consumer prices without improving quality and limiting opportunities for new entrants in the field. In this policy brief, we focus on occupational licensing in the state of Wisconsin and put that state’s practices into the broader context of existing economic research."
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The State of Occupational Licensure in North Carolina |
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BY: Patrick A. McLaughlin, Matthew D. Mitchell, Anne Philpot, and Tamara Winter
DATE: May 14, 2018
“When a state imposes licensing rules on an occupation, workers cannot legally practice that trade without fulfilling a set of requirements. When a state imposes certification rules on an occupation, noncertified workers can still legally practice their trade, but certification proves that those workers have met certain state-defined professional benchmarks. About a third of North Carolina’s workforce is licensed or certified. Occupational licensing is ostensibly intended to protect the public from unsafe and low-quality service, but there is little evidence this intention is realized. Rather, there is a growing consensus among economists that these rules serve to protect incumbent providers from competition by creating barriers for new entrants that lead to higher prices for consumers."
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The State of Occupational Licensure in Nevada |
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BY: Patrick A. McLaughlin, Matthew D. Mitchell, Anne Philpot, and Tamara Winter
DATE: March 26, 2018
“When a state imposes licensing rules on an occupation, workers cannot legally practice that trade without fulfilling a set of requirements. When a state imposes certification rules on an occupation, non-certified workers can still legally practice their trade, but certification proves that those workers have met certain state-defined professional benchmarks. About a third of Nevada’s workforce is licensed or certified. Occupational licensing is ostensibly intended to protect the public from unsafe and low-quality service, but there is little evidence that this intention is realized. Rather, there is a growing consensus among economists that these rules serve to protect incumbent providers from competition by creating barriers for new entrants, ultimately leading to higher prices for consumers.”
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The State of Occupational Licensure in Nebraska |
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BY: Patrick A. McLaughlin, Matthew D. Mitchell, Anne Philpot, and Tamara Winter
DATE: January 3, 2018
“When a state imposes licensing rules on an occupation, workers cannot legally practice that trade without fulfilling a set of requirements. Nebraska requires about a third of its workforce to have a license or certification. Occupational licensing is ostensibly intended to protect the public from unsafe and low-quality service, but there is little evidence that this intention is realized. Rather, there is a growing consensus among economists that these rules serve to protect incumbent providers from competition by creating barriers for new entrants that lead to higher prices for consumers.”
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The State of Occupational Licensure in Missouri |
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BY: Patrick A. McLaughlin, Matthew D. Mitchell, Anne Philpot, and Tamara Winter
DATE: October 30, 2017
“When a state imposes licensing rules on an occupation, workers cannot legally practice that trade without fulfilling a set of requirements. Missouri requires about a quarter of its workforce to have a license or certification. Occupational licensing is ostensibly intended to protect the public from unsafe and low-quality service, but there is little evidence this intention is realized. Rather, there is a growing consensus among economists that these rules serve to protect incumbent providers from competition by creating barriers for new entrants that lead to higher prices for consumers.”
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The State of Occupational Licensure in Michigan |
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BY: Patrick A. McLaughlin, Matthew D. Mitchell, Anne Philpot, and Tamara Winter
DATE: February 28, 2018
“When a state imposes licensing rules on an occupation, workers cannot legally practice that trade without fulfilling a set of requirements. When a state imposes certification rules on an occupation, noncertified workers can still legally practice their trade, but certification acts as proof of those workers having met certain state-defined professional benchmarks. About a quarter of Michigan’s workforce is licensed or certified. Occupational licensing is ostensibly intended to protect the public from unsafe and low-quality service, but there is little evidence that this intention is realized. Rather, there is a growing consensus among economists that these rules serve to protect incumbent providers from competition by creating barriers for new entrants, ultimately leading to higher prices for consumers.”
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The State of Occupational Licensure in Illinois |
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BY: Patrick A. McLaughlin, Matthew D. Mitchell, and Andrew M. Baxter
DATE: June 19, 2017
“Occupational licensing is ostensibly intended to protect the public from unsafe and low-quality service. But a broad and growing consensus among economists suggests that these rules mostly serve to protect incumbent providers from competition, raising consumer prices and limiting opportunities for new entrants in the field without improving quality. In this policy brief, we focus on occupational licensing in the state of Illinois and put that state’s practices into the broader context of existing economic research.”
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